Party competition is the primary driver of the recent increase in restrictive voter id laws in the American states by Hicks, William D. et al.
blogs.lse.ac.uk
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/11/12/party-competition-is-the-primary-driver-of-the-recent-increase-in-restrictive-voter-id-
laws-in-the-american-states/
Party competition is the primary driver of the recent increase in
restrictive voter ID laws in the American states
The lead up to the recent midterm elections was marked by contentious debates
over the effects on turnout of voter ID laws passed in several American states. In
new research William D. Hicks, Seth C. McKee, Mitchell D. Sellers and Daniel A.
Smith find that there has been a large increase in the number of states that have
adopted voter ID laws since 2001, and in these states the level of partisan
polarization in voting on these laws is very high. They find that not only is the
introduction and passage of stricter voter ID legislation influenced by the number of
Republican lawmakers in a state legislature, but how electorally competitive the
environment that those legislators find themselves in is important as well.
A few weeks before the 2014 midterm elections the state of Texas had its strict photo
identification law struck down by a federal judge, only to have it reinstated by the
Supreme Court just as early voting was scheduled to begin. For many Democrats,
and especially many African Americans, the Texas photo ID law was a rallying cry to
mobilize minority voters against an overwhelming Anglo Republican majority. The midterm elections have since
passed and Texas Republicans, as they have for the last twenty years, won every statewide office. The Grand Old
Party (GOP) cleaned house in congressional and state legislative races not only in Texas, but nationally, and took
back control of the U.S. Senate.
In historical context, the most recent election cycle was unremarkable, hewing closely to the partisan dynamic
expected for a president’s party in the sixth year of his second term. But what has changed is the deep partisan
polarization over restrictive election laws whose passage speaks to the increasingly competitive and yet volatile
national electoral landscape of American politics. And in this current state of affairs the coalitions that comprise the
Democratic and Republican national parties have never been so segregated in demographic terms. The voluntary
sorting of voters into partisan camps along notable racial and economic divisions fosters the GOP push for
restrictive election laws whose costs are expected to fall disproportionately on Democratic supporters.
In a recent study, we tracked the evolution of voter ID laws to understand the macro-level factors shaping their
introduction and passage across American state legislatures from 2001 to 2012. We find that party competition in
primarily GOP controlled state legislatures is the main driver of the increase in restrictive voter ID laws.
Following the debacle in Florida in the 2000 presidential election, instead of ushering in strict photo ID laws,
Congress passed the bipartisan 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA). It was not until 2005 that Republicans
decided to radically alter the rules of the electoral game, when the Indiana state legislature passed along straight
partisan lines a law requiring voters to present government-issued photo ID. The legislation marked a turning
point; since then, with the exception of Democratic-controlled Rhode Island (in 2011), every state legislature that
has passed a strict photo identification law has been controlled by Republicans.
Figure 1 shows the impressive rise in the number of restrictive voter ID laws passed by state legislatures, both of
the photo and non-photo variety, from 2002 to 2012. The marked increase in restrictive voter ID laws in the wake
of the 2010 elections is a result of the GOP winning control of numerous statehouses that the Democrats
previously commanded. Beyond the southern flavor prevalent among states introducing voter ID laws, what
captured our attention in the data was the palpable activity among so-called battleground states, where the flip to
GOP state legislative majorities quickly led to enactment of restrictive photo ID legislation.
Figure 1 – The Number of States Adopting Voter ID Laws from 2002 to 2012
Knowing that voter ID laws have been effectively presented to the public as a valence issue in which Republicans
advocate their use as a safeguard against voter fraud, whereas Democrats excoriate them as thinly veiled “good
government” reforms whose real purpose is to curtail Democratic participation, it is no wonder that the opposing
partisan perspectives have produced extraordinarily polarized votes in state legislatures. Figure 2 displays the
degree of partisan polarization across a broad sample of states passing restrictive voter ID laws from 2005 to
2014. The plots of state abbreviations depict a simple polarization measure that subtracts the absolute value of
the percent of Democrats voting against restrictive voter ID from the percent of Republicans voting in favor, from
one hundred [(100) – (% Republicans voting YES – % Democrats voting NO)]. Hence, in Indiana in 2005, we see
100% partisan polarization since all Democrats voted no and all Republicans voted yes. It is clear that this is not
the only case of absolute polarization – in most of these states passing restrictive voter ID legislation the degree of
partisan polarization is very high.
Figure 2 – Partisan Polarization on State Legislative Votes for Strict Voter ID Laws
If it is true that restrictive voter ID laws are merely a Republican ploy for attaining an electoral advantage, then
assessing the main factors contributing to their enactment should provide evidence of this behavior without hoping
for a smoking gun (which incidentally was offered up by Republican House Majority Leader Mike Turzai, who
expected the passage of a strict photo ID law in Pennsylvania to deliver the state to Mitt Romney). By analyzing
restrictive voter ID law activity at both the introduction and passage stages we uncovered strong support for the
expectation that electoral competition drives their promotion. Because Republican lawmakers overwhelmingly
back restrictive voter ID laws, the primary finding in our models is a statistically significant and substantively large
interactive effect between the percentage of GOP legislators and the election margin for all state legislative
contests pitting a Democrat against a Republican.
In other words, both the likelihood of introducing and passing restrictive voter ID laws is heavily dependent on not
just the number of Republican lawmakers in a state legislature, but whether they find themselves in a more
electorally competitive environment. And with respect to the issue of fraud, we found a predictable dynamic for
this factor. In the case of bill introductions the number of alleged fraud cases exhibits a statistically significant and
positive influence – a compelling rationale for putting forward restrictive voter ID measures. But at the passage
stage, we found that the number of fraud claims has no effect; just as we anticipated, these alleged incidents are
not instrumental in the enactment of restrictive voter ID legislation, whereas partisan competition is.
Figure 3 displays the effect of the aforementioned interactive variable (% GOP lawmakers X partisan election
margin) on the passage of a strict voter ID law. By segmenting the degree of state legislative competition
according to the two-party vote margin into “competitive,” “average,” and “uncompetitive” categories, Figure 3
makes it clear that as the percent of Republican lawmakers increase and if the electoral environment is
competitive, then a restrictive voter ID law is much more likely to be enacted.
Figure 3 – Party Control and the Probability of Strict Voter ID Policy Adoption
Note: Density of the percentage of GOP lawmakers is plotted on the x-axis.
The story of voter ID laws in contemporary American politics is not really about heroes (Democrats) and villains
(Republicans). Rather it is a story as old as America’s Founding. Republicans have assessed the characteristics
of their coalition of voters and realized that a certain voting restriction should negatively and disproportionately
affect their Democratic opponents. The GOP is merely playing politics, but in this instance it is disconcerting
because they are doing so with suffrage and most Americans consider voting a sacred right, not a costly
privilege. 
This article is based on the paper ‘A Principle or a Strategy? Voter Identification Laws and Partisan Competition in
the American States’, in Political Research Quarterly.
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